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1. INTRODUCTION 
The modern modeling research on macroeconomics combines micro-foundations of 
both households and firms optimisation problems and with a large collection of both 
nominal and real (price/wage) rigidities that provide plausible short-run dynamic 
macroeconomic fluctuations with a fully articulated description of the monetary-cum-fiscal 
policy transmission mechanism; see, for instance, Christiano, et al. (2005) and Smets and 
Wouters (2003). The key advantage of this area of research over traditional reduce form 
macroeconomic models, is that the structural interpretation of their parameters allows to 
overcome the famous Lucas critique (1976). Traditional models contained equations linking 
variables of interest of explanatory factors such as economic policy variables. One of the 
uses of these models was therefore to examine how a change in economic policy affected 
these variables of interest, other things being equal.  Based on these advantages there has 
been a growing interest in academics, international policy institutions and central banks in 
developing small-to-medium, even large-scale, both closed and open economy DSGE 
models based on new-Keynesian framework. In using DSGE models for practical purposes 
and to recommend how central banks and policy institutions should react to the short-run 
fluctuations, it is necessary to first examine the possible sources, as well as to evaluate the 
degree of nominal and real rigidities present in the economy. As price stability is the 
primary objective of every central bank so it is an important task to model inflation 
dynamics with its associated nominal rigidities using DSGE models carefully.  
Therefore the core objective of this paper is to consider various nominal frictions, 
especially price stickiness with its alternative representations of the inflation dynamics, 
each one having formal microeconomic foundations. To learn dynamics of this friction 
associated with each representation we considered four competing closed economy 
DSGE models: a standard Calvo type pricing model; Hernandez’s (2004) state-dependent 
pricing model; Mankiw and Reis (2002) standard sticky information model; and a mixed 
version of sticky price-information model. Each model incorporates various other 
standard New-Keynesian features such as habit formation, costs of adjustment in capital 
accumulation and variable capacity utilisation. While in the standard Calvo (1983) 
model, some prices are exogenously fixed for certain periods and the Phillips curve 
associated it performs badly to reproduce the gradual and delayed effects of monetary 
shocks on inflation. Mankiw and Reis (2002) propose to replace it with a Sticky 
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information model. In that last specification, firms face some frictions while updating 
their information sets to determine the optimal flexible price. 
However, in the two cases, the frequency of price revisions is constant and without 
cost. Price-setters cannot respond to shocks in the economy between price revisions. In 
such a context, literature on state-dependent pricing [e.g. Dotsey, et al. (1999)] allows 
firms either to evaluate in every period if it is convenient to change their price contracts 
or to keep them unchanged given a random cost. So we also simulate the performance of 
the Hernandez’s (2004) model which combines state-dependent and time-dependent 
features in the firms pricing scheme is investigated as a natural extension of the Calvo 
model. Finally for each model, the Ramsey allocation has been computed, giving a 
natural benchmark for welfare comparisons. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an outline of 
Common theoretical framework. In Section 3 he main different responses observed 
across each specification essentially by the nature of nominal rigidities. The 
methodologies and empirical setup are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 describes the 
estimation results and finally we bring to a close in Section 6 with concluding remarks 
and possible model extensions. 
 
2.  COMMON THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The following relationships are common to all models in the specification of the 
economy. These specifications are similar to Christiano, et al. (2005) and Smets and 
Wouters (2003). The main features of the closed economy DSGE model are habit 
formation in consumption, capital adjustment costs and a large number of shocks 
essential for the fit with data. Such a common framework is a mean to obtain comparable 
New Keynesian Phillips curves and to explain the main different responses observed 
across each specification essentially by the nature of nominal rigidities. 
 
2.1.  Households Preferences 
The economy is inhabited by a representative household (h) who derives its utility 
from consumption Ct, and leisure 1–Lt. At time t, its preferences are described by an 
intertemporal utility function: 
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Where t  (0,1) is the intertemporal discount factor which describe rate of time 
preferences, c is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in 
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consumption and L  is the inverse of wage elasticity of labour supply.  We introduce 
external habit formation for the optimisation household as 1( )t t jH C h   with degree 
of intensity indexed by  , where 1t jC    is the aggregate part of consumption index. 
Utility also incorporates a consumption preference shock Bt j   and a labour supply shock 
L
t j  .   is the scale parameter. As usual, it is assumed that,  0c   and 1L  .  
Each household h maximises its utility function under the following budgetary 
constraint: 
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Where Bt(h) is a nominal bond, Wt(h) is the nominal wage, At(h) is a stream of income 
coming from state contingent securities, ( )tT h  and ,w t  are government transfers and 
time-varying labour tax respectively, and ( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( )kt t t t tr u h K h u h K h  represents the 
return on the real capital stock minus the cost associated with variations in the degree of 
capital utilisation. As in Christiano, et al. (2005), the income from renting out capital 
services depends on the level of capital augmented for its utilisation rate. The cost of 
capacity utilisation is zero when capacity are fully used ( (1) 0   and (1), (1) 0    ). 
Separability of preferences and complete financial markets ensure that households 
have identical consumption plans. The first order condition related to consumption 
expenditures is given by: 
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Where t  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint. First 
order conditions corresponding to the quantity of contingent bonds implies that: 
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Where it is the one-period-ahead nominal interest rate. 
 
2.2.  Labour Supply and Staggered Wage Settings 
Each household is a monopoly supplier of a differentiated labour service. For the 
sake of simplicity, we assume that he sells his services to a perfectly competitive firm 
which transforms it into an aggregate labour input using the following technology: 
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The household faces a labour demand curve with constant elasticity of 
substitution: 
1( )
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Where: 
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is the aggregate wage rate. 
Households set their wage on a staggered basis. Each period, any household faces 
a constant probability 1 w  of changing its wage. In such a case, the wage is set to tw  
which is the same for all suppliers of labour services, taking into account that it will not 
be re-optimised in the near future. Otherwise, wages are adjusted following an indexation 
rule on past inflation and central bank objective: 
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1
t
t
t
P
P
  denotes one plus the GDP deflator inflation rate while  1
t
t
t
P
P
  denotes one 
plus the inflation objective of the central bank and w  is fraction of wage. 
Notice that among the fraction of wage setters, which cannot re-optimise in 
period t; each nominal wage appears with the same frequency as in the t–1 
distribution after controlling for the common indexation on inflation rates. This 
property crucially hinges on the fact that each wage has an equal probability of being 
adjusted in a given period. 
Consequently, the dynamics of the aggregate wage index is given by: 
1 1
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Each household chooses tw  in order to maximise: 
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Given that the demand for differentiated labour service for wage setters who 
cannot re-optimise after period t, becomes: 
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Thus, the first order condition for the re-optimised wage verifies: 
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Let us denote tw as the real wage. The previous equation can therefore be 
rewritten as: 
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Accordingly, the aggregate wage dynamics leads to the following relation. 
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2.3.  Investment Dynamics 
As in Smets and Wouters (2003), we introduce a delayed response of investment 
observed in the data. Capital producers combine existing capital, Kt, leased from the 
entrepreneurs to transform an input It, gross investment, into new capital according to: 
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Where It is gross investment,  is the depreciation rate and the adjustment cost 
function S()  is a positive function of changes in investment. S() equals zero in steady 
state with a constant investment level ( (1) 0S  ) . In addition, we assume that the first 
derivative also equals zero around equilibrium, so that the adjustment costs will only 
depend on the second-order derivative (S() as in Christiano, et al. (2005). We also 
introduced a shock to the investment cost function, which is assumed to follow a first-
order autoregressive process with an IID-Normal error term: 1 .
I I I
t I t tE E     
Households choose the capital stock, investment and the capacity utilisation rate in 
order to maximise their intertemporal utility function subject to the intertemporal budget 
constraint and the capital accumulation. The first-order conditions result in the following 
equations for the real value of capital, investment and the capacity utilisation rate: 
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The value of installed capital depends on the expected future value taking into 
account the depreciation rate and the expected future return as captured by the rental rate 
times the expected rate of capital utilisation. 
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( )Kt tR CU   … … … … … … … (9) 
Where, KtR  is rental rate of capital and 
I
tE  can be interpreted as a shock to the relative 
price of investment while QtE  accounts for fluctuations of the external finance risk premium. 
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2.4.  Firms Behaviour 
Intermediate goods are produced with a Cobb-Douglas technology as follows: 
  11( ) ( ) ( ) ( )At t t t tY h E CU h K h L h      (0,1)h   
Where AtE  is an exogenous technology parameter and  is a fixed cost. Firms 
are monopolistic competitors and produce differentiated products an aggregate final good 
that may be used for consumption and investment. This production is obtained using a 
continuum of differentiated intermediate goods with the following Dixit and Stiglitz 
(1977) production technology: 
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Where 
1
P
P
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   and P > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between differentiated 
goods. The representative final good producer maximises profits 
1
0
( ) ( )t t t tPY P z Y z dh   
subject to the production function (10), taking as given the final good price Pt and the prices of 
all intermediate goods. The first order condition for this problem is: 
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Finally, as the sector is perfectly competitive, the zero profit condition holds and 
the expression for Pt is: 
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2.5. Government 
Public expenditures G G are subject to random shocks GtE . The government finances 
public spending with labour tax, product tax and lump-sum transfers are expressed as: 
, 0
G
t t W t t t t t t t tP GE W L PY PTT      … … … … (12) 
The government also controls the short term interest rate Rt. Monetary policy is 
specified in terms of an interest rate rule: the monetary authority follows generalised 
Taylor rules which incorporate deviations of lagged inflation and the lagged output gap 
defined as the difference between actual and flexible-price output. Such reaction 
functions also incorporate a non-systematic component: GtE . 
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3. PRICE SETTING MODELS AND OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY 
This section presents the baseline version of the standard Calvo, State Dependent 
Pricing (SDP) and the Sticky Information (SI) models of price setting as different 
nominal rigidities modelling strategies. Furthermore, optimal monetary policy principle is 
also included in this section.  
 
3.1.  Models Based on Price Stickiness 
In this section we describe two competing models based on price stickiness; (a) a 
standard Calvo (1983) type price stickiness model, and (b) a recent extension by 
Hernandez’s (2004): state dependent pricing model. Both these models capture the 
fundamental notion of staggered price mechanism and translate them into New 
Keynesian Phillips curve.  
 
3.1.1.  Standard Calvo (1983) Model 
In each period, firms receive a random signal with constant probability 1 – p that allows 
them to change the price *tp . This probability is independent across firms and time. The 
average duration of a rigidity period is 1
1 p . If a firm cannot re-optimise its price, the 
price evolves according to the following simple rule: 1 11( ) ( )
p p
t t ttp h p h

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Firms that are allowed to change their price maximise expected profit: 
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is the marginal value of one unit of money to the household. MCt+j is the real marginal 
cost and t is a time-varying tax on firm’s revenue. Due to our assumptions on the labour 
market and the rental rate of capital, the real marginal cost is identical across producers. 
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The first order condition for the optimal nominal reset price *tp  is: 
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In this study, the aggregate price level which incorporates rule of thumb price 
setters evolves according to: 
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This price setting scheme can be written in the following recursive form: 
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t t t t p t t
t t
Z MC Y E Z

 

               


     … … … (13) 
and 
1
1
1
2, 2, 11
1
(1 )
p p
t
t t t t p t t
t t
Z Y E Z

 

                

      … … … (14) 
Accordingly, the aggregate price dynamics leads to the following relation: 
1 1
1 1
1,
1
2,1
1 (1 )
p p
tt
p p
ttt
Z
Z
 


              
 
     … … … (15) 
The above specification of Calvo price for which, p equals to 0 is considered as 
a standard Calvo. 
 
3.1.2.  An Extension: State Dependent Pricing Model 
Hernandez’s (2004) model gives an explicit role for the average frequency of 
price revisions in the inflation-output relation, by including state dependent 
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fluctuations. To be more precise, it combines state-dependent and time-dependent 
features in the firms’ pricing scheme. Firms are allowed to choose a higher 
probability of price revisions. In that case, they have to pay a lump sum cost which is 
random as in Dotsey, et al. (2004). There are two kinds of monopolistic 
firms [ , ]j L H . The first one revises prices with the lower probability (1 – H) in 
each period but as soon as they receive the random signal of price revision, they have 
the possibility to benefit from faster price revisions (1 – H) by paying the cost , 
with the probability t.  If not, they can set a new price without cost but with the 
lower probability. The second one always adjusts prices with the higher probability 
and without cost. 
The profit maximisation program respectively in the two cases is written as 
follows, supposing L > 0 and H = 0: 
If z  L then: 
,
1
0 , , 1 , 1 , 1
( )
1
1 0 , 1 1 1
1
1 0 , 1 1
max (1 ) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), )
(1 ) ( ( ) )
(1 ) (1 ) ( )
j t
t
j t j j t t j t j t j t t
p z t
t
j t t H t t t
t
t
j t t L t t
t
D d p z S E D p z S
E D S
E D S
  
    
   
   
  
  
 
  
  
 
Where; 
1
1 , , 1 , 1 , 1
1
1 0 , 1 1 1
1
1 0 , 1 1
( ) (1 ) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), )
(1 ) ( ( ) )
(1 ) (1 ) ( )
t i
j t i t i j j t t i j t j t j t t i
t i
t i
j t t i H t i t i t i
t i
t i
j t t i L t i t i
t i
D S d p z S E D p z S
E D S
E D S
      
         
       
   
  
  
 
  
  
 
and the real profits: 
  1, ,, ( ) ( )( ( ), ) j t j tj t t t t
t t
p z p z
d p z S MC Y
P P
               
 


 
If z H  then: 
,
1
0 , , 1 , 1 , 1
( )
1
0 , 1 1
max ( ) (1 ) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), )
(1 ) ( )
H t
t
H t t H H t t H t H t H t t
p z t
t
H t H t t
t
D S d p z S E D p z S
E D S
  
  
   
     
 
 
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Where; 
1
1 , , 1 , 1 , 1
1
0 , 1 1
( ) (1 ) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), )
(1 ) ( )
t i
H t i t i H H t t i H t H t i H t t i
t i
t i
H t H t i t i
t i
D S d p z S E D p z S
E D S
       
     
   
     
 
 
 
The first order condition in both cases gives the same optimal price: 
1,
,
2,
t
j t
t
Z
p
Z
   
Where; 
1 1
1, 1, 1
t
t t t t j t
t
Z MC Y P Z  
     

    
and 
1
1 1
2, 2, 1
t
t t t j t
t
Z Y P Z  
     
    
Knowing that, the probability of j choosing(1 – H) is: 
0 , 0 ,1 exp( [ ])t H t L tb D D     
and the conditional expected random cost is: 
   1 0 , 1 0 , 1 0 , 1 0 , 1
1
1 1 1/ .exp [ ]t t t H t L t H t L t
t
E E b D D b D D
b    
           
Let Vt be the mass of all firms z  L that chose before and up to t (1 – H) and have not 
changes their price since that time. Consider t, the mass of firms that choose(1 – L) at t 
and  , the mass of firms in L. 
The dynamics of Vt and t is given by the following equations: 
1 1 1(1 ) (1 )(1 )t t t L t t H t
t t
V V V
V
       
 
    
   
With for initial conditions, the steady state values of t  and Vt, respectively 0 and V0. 
In this standard version, the aggregate price level evolves according to: 
11 11/1 1/11/1
0 0, ,
0
( ( )) (1 )t t L t H tP p z dz P P

           

     
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Where; 
1/1 1/1
1
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0 0
, 1 1 1 ,
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L t t
L L t L t t t L t
P P s ds
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 


  
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
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1
1
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,
0
, 1 1 1 ,
0
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1
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t
H t t
H H t H t t t H t
P P s ds
P V V p
 


  
      
      

 



  
 
With Vt – Vt–1, the mass of firms z  L choosing (1 – H) at t. 
 
3.2. The Sticky Information Model 
In each period, a randomly chosen fraction of agents updates their information set. 
To be more precise, prices are flexible in the sense that firms are allowed to change them 
in any periods, but at a different level than in a full information environment while they 
do not have the same information available about the state of the world. Therefore, prices 
fixed based on different information coexist in the economy. This model has the property 
that its modeling does not depend on the value of the steady state of inflation. 
At t, firms choose the price *tp  using all current information. Define Pt, the 
overall price index. The optimal price is determined by the solution of the profit 
maximisation problem: 
( )
max (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ( ) )
t
t j t t t t t t
p h
E p h Y h MC P Y h       
where Yt(h) is the demand schedule: 
* 1( )
( ) tt t
t
p h
Y h Y
P
      


 
The first order condition of this program gives the following relationship between 
the optimal price *( )tp h and the real marginal cost MCt: 
*( )
1t t tt
p h MC P 

  
Lets consider the hybrid specification with backward looking agents as in Gali and 
Gertler (1999) by adding rule of thumb price setters. 
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Then the aggregate price level is given by: 
 1 111 *1 111 1
0
( ) (1 ) (1 ) . ( ( ))p p jt p t p t j tt
j
P P E p h
   

          

 
      
In each period, firms face a constant probability (1–p) of receiving a signal that 
allows them to change their price. 
The last equation can be rewritten as follows: 
  11 1 111 11 1
0
( ) (1 ) (1 ) .
(1 )
p p j t t
t p t p t jt
tj
P MC
P P E
    

                  

           
Some manipulations allow us to obtain the stationary version of the previous 
equation which symbolises the non linear Sticky information Phillips curve: 
 
11 1 11 111
1
0
(1 ) (1 ) .
(1 )
p p jt t t t
p p t jt
t J t J t t Jj
P P MC P
E
P P P
       
                              

 
         
Knowing that: 
1
0
J
t
t s
t J s
P
P

 
   
For computational reasons, the scheme truncates the infinite horizon in the age 
distribution of information sets, such as agents set their prices based on information 
outdates by J=12 periods (that is to say 3 years). Therefore, this parameterisation leads us 
to divide the previous Phillips curve by the parameter: 
0
(1 )
J
j
j
     
3.3. Market Equilibrium 
Aggregate demand is given by: 
1( )
G
t t t t t tY C I G u K      
Market clearing condition on goods market is given by: 
11 1
10
0
11
1
10
( ) ( ( )) ( ( ))
( )
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A
t t t t t
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t t t
t
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 
 
    
 

 




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Or 
1
, ( ) ( )
A
p t t t t t tY u K L
     
With: 
1 1
, 0
( )t
p t
t
p z
dz
P
      


 
It measures the price dispersion due to the staggered price setting. As in the case of 
the aggregate price index, we can show that this price dispersion index under Calvo 
contracts and sticky information (SI) contracts has respectively the following dynamics: 
* 11 111 1
, 10 1
1 11,
, 1 1 2,1
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The aggregate unconditional welfare is defined by: 
1
0
( )t tu u h dh   
We already mentioned that all household have the same consumption plans. 
Consequently: 
 1 11 ,
0
1
1 1
C L
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t jj B
t t t j t j w t j t jt j
C Lj
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Where; 
(1 )
1 1
, 0
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L w
wt
w t
t
W h
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W
      
 

 
As for the price dispersion index: 
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  
               
   
  
 
     (17) 
 
3.4.  Optimal Monetary Policy (Main Principle) 
The optimal monetary policy or the Ramsey policy under commitment consists in 
maximising the intertemporal households’ welfare (Ut) subject to a set of non-linear 
structural constraints of the model. 
To be more precise, a Ramsey equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium such that: 
(i) Given a sequence of shocks, prices, policy instrument and quantities Pt; Rt; 
0ttQ
  it maximises the representative agent lifetime utility, Ut. 
(ii) ti  > 0. 
In order to analyse essentially the macroeconomic stabilisation properties of the 
monetary policy, we assume subsidies on labour and goods markets are offsetting first 
order distortions. In that case, the flexible price equilibrium is Pareto optimal. The 
Ramsey policy problem is written using an infinite horizon Lagrangian: 
2
0
( )
J
j
t t r t j
j
L U E i i

      (Model Constraints) … … (18) 
Where r is the weight associated to the cost on nominal interest rate fluctuations. We 
introduce an interest rate objective in this problem in order to make the Ramsey policy 
operational. The first order conditions to this problem are obtained using the symbolic 
toolbox of Matlab 2008. 
 
4.  THE EMPIRICAL SETUP 
This section briefly outlines the empirical setup by illustrating data, choice of 
priors and estimation methodology used in this paper. We adopted the empirical approach 
outlined in Smets and Wouters (2003) and estimate our augmented DSGE models with 
sticky prices-information and wages employing Bayesian inference methods. This 
involves obtaining the posterior distribution of the parameters of the model based on its 
log-linear state-space representation and assessing its empirical performance in terms of 
its marginal likelihood. In the following we briefly sketch the adopted approach and 
describe the data and the prior distributions used in its implementation. We then present 
our estimation results in next coming section. 
 
4.1.  Data 
We consider 7 key macro-economic quarterly time series from 1973q1 to 2004q4: 
output, consumption, investment, hours worked, real wages, GDP deflator inflation rate, 
and 3 month short-term interest rate. Euro area data are taken from Smets and Wouters 
(2003) and Euro-stat official website. Concerning the euro area, employment numbers 
 Haider and Ramzi 540
replace hours. Consequently, as in Smets and Wouters, hours are linked to the number of 
people employed et with the following dynamics: 
*
1
(1 )(1 )
( )e et t t t t
e
e E e l e
       
Aggregate real variables are expressed per capita by dividing with working age 
population. All the data are detrended before the estimation. Since the model has 
implications for the log-deviations from the steady-state of all these variables, so we pre-
process the data before the estimation stage. 
 
4.2. Choice of Priors 
In the overall, the set of priors corresponds to the ones in Smets and Wouters 
(2003) (see Tables 2 to 5). 
 
4.2.1.  Common Parameters 
The discount factor β is calibrated to 0.99, which implies annual steady state real 
interest rates of 4 percent. The depreciation rate δ is equal to 0.0025 per quarter. Markups 
are 1.3 in the goods market and 1.5 in the labour market. The steady state is consistent 
with labour income share in total output of 70 percent. Shares of consumption and 
investment in total output are respectively 0.65 and 0.18. 
 
4.2.2.  Calvo and State Dependent Pricing based Model Parameters 
Two additional parameters (p and p). The parameter p which determines the 
probability that firms are allowed to change their price, has a prior mean of 0.75 and a 
standard deviation of 0.0084. Regarding the hybrid specification, the parameter of partial 
indexation to lagged inflation follows a Beta-distribution. 
 
4.2.3. Sticky Information based Model Parameters 
Lets suppose the same prior for the previous parameters in that case and consider   which is the probability to receive new information about the state of the economy, 
follows a Beta-distribution with the mean of 0.75 and the standard deviation of 0.0512. 
This parameter value is also consistent with Mankiw and Reis (2002). 
 
4.3. Bayesian Estimation Approach 
In empirical literature, there are numerous strategies used to determine the 
parameters of new-Keynesian DSGE models. These ranging from pure calibration, e.g., 
Kydland and Prescott (1982), Monacelli (2003), over generalised method of moments 
(GMM) for estimation of general equilibrium relationships, e.g., Christiano and 
Eichenbaum (1992), to full-information based maximum likelihood estimation as in 
Altug (1989), Mcgrattan (1994), Leeper and Sims (1994), Kim (2000) and Irland (2000). 
Other studies also proposed mixed strategies like limited-information based methods to 
explore a key question whether a DSGE model matches the data with some certain 
dimensions. For example, Canova (2002) and Christiano, et al. (2005) used minimum 
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distance based criterion to estimate VAR and DSGE model impulse response functions. 
Further methodological debate can be referred using the following studies by Diebold 
(1998), Ruge-Murcia (2003) and Tovar (2008). 
Other than these proposed estimation and calibration strategies, this study uses 
another estimation approach called Bayesian estimation approach. This alternative 
approach is a combination of calibration and estimation of selected model parameters. 
The fundamental advantage of this approach is a batter adoption of the model to the 
conditions in the given economy, [see e.g., Smets and Wouters (2003)].  
In any empirical modeling exercise, there are three possible sources of 
uncertainty; the model itself; the parameterisation condition of the model and the 
data. The debate on the issue of uncertainty is the most important as it provide a 
difference between frequentist (classical) and Bayesian approach. In classical 
approach the probability of the occurrence of an event, i.e., the measurement of 
uncertainty is associated with its frequency. However, in Bayesian approach, the 
probability of an event is determined by two components; the subjective believe 
(prior) and the frequency of that event. For further detail on this notion, [see for 
instance Gelman (2006) and Koopman, et al. (2007)]. 
The seminal work on DSGE modeling used this approach started with the study by 
Landon-Lane (1998), DeJong, et al. (2000), Schorfheide (2000) and Otrok (2001). This 
approach has been generalised by Lubik and Schorfheide (2005) who estimate a DSGE 
model without providing restrictions to the determinacy region of the parameter space. 
Almost all recent studies on DSGE model has been used this approach, e.g., Smets and 
Wouters (2003), Laforte (2004), Onatski and Williams (2004), Ratto, et al. (2008), 
Adolfson, et al. (2008) and Kolasa (2008). 
In practical sense, we try to fit out referenced model, which consists in placing a 
prior distribution p() on structural parameters , the estimate of which are then updated 
using the data YT according to the Bayes rule: 
( / )( / ) ( / ) ( )
( )
T
T T
T
p Yp Y L Y p
p Y
       … … … … (19) 
Where ( / ) ( / )T Tp Y L Y    is the likelihood function ( / )Tp Y  is the posterior 
distribution of parameters and ( )Tp Y  is the marginal likelihood defined as: 
( ) ( / ) ( )T Tp Y p Y p d      … … … … … (20) 
Any DSGE model forms a linear system with rational expectations, the solution to 
which is of the form: 
1 1 2( ) ( )t t tR B R B          … … … … … … (21) 
3 1 4( ) ( )t t tB B           … … … … … … (22) 
Where Rt is a vector of endogenous variables, t is a vector of stochastic disturbances and 
t is a vector of innovations to stochastic shocks and coefficient matrices Ai depending on 
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the parameters of the model. The measurement Equations (21) and (22) linking 
observable variables used in the estimation with endogenous variables can be written as: 
T
tY CR       … … … … … … … … (23) 
Where, C is the deterministic matrix. The Equations (21), (22) and (23) form the state-
space representation of the model. The likelihood of which can be evaluated using 
Kalman filter. The analytical solution of the whole system may not be obtain in general, 
however the sequence of posterior draws can be obtain using Markov-Chain-Monte-Carlo 
(MCMC) simulation methodology. This methodology is briefly discussed in Lubik and 
Schorfheide (2005), Gelman, et al. (2006) and Koopman, et al. (2007). For our 
estimation setup the random walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is used to generate 
Morkov-Chains (MC) for the model parameters.  
 
5.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The Bayesian framework as discussed in previous section is used in order to 
compare the purely forward looking and hybrid Calvo to the baseline and the hybrid 
specifications of a truncated Sticky Information model, under the assumption that the 
models have equal prior probabilities. 
 
5.1.  Model Comparison Based on Marginal Densities 
The following Table 1 reports the marginal densities for the all pricing models. 
The model with the highest marginal density is the standard Calvo model over the other 
specifications. In the overall, it dominates the sticky information for all specifications in 
terms of marginal densities. 
 
Table 1 
 Model Comparison 
Marginal Density Laplace Appr. Metropolis Acceptation Rates 
Model    
State-Dependent –467.549 –466.673 0.36954 
Standard Calvo –472.703 –471.660 0.28976 – 0.28845 
Hybrid Calvo –473.223 –472.247 0.27243 – 0.27305 
Mixed Standard Sticky Info (J=12) –514.784 –515.292 0.23582 
Mixed Hybrid Sticky Info (J=12) –518.912 –519.466 0.19194 
Standard Sticky Info (J=12) –591.869 –592.952 0.21310 
Hybrid Sticky Info (J=12) –515.399 –515.796 0.28529 
Table Key: The Mixed Hybrid SI with 22 lags gives the Marginal Density –514.2014 (Laplace Approximation). 
 
In the literature, the motivation for including inertia is largely empirical and 
justified theoretically with an assumption that a fixed proportion of firms has backward-
looking price setting behaviour. Empirically the adequacy of this model, which nests the 
pure forward-looking sticky price model and inherits the good properties of backward-
looking behaviour, to data is controversial. In this study using Bayesian estimation, the 
introduction of indexation to lagged inflation is not a necessary condition to reproduce 
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plausible inflation dynamics as in the standard Calvo model, [see for instance Laforte 
(2004); Paustian and Pytlarczyk (2006)]. 
Some researchers criticise all models built on the sticky price hypothesis because 
they would not be at odds with the facts and the hybrid models would be even worse than 
the standard ones [see for example, Mankiw and Reis (2002)]. They advise to replace this 
specification by Sticky Information contracts that prevent inflation to jump immediately 
after shocks. However under such pricing, the fit is poor and regarding the Hybrid curve, 
all expected inflation is integrated in the price path such as the scheme of indexation is 
again of little interest. Moreover, the extension of the maximum age of outdated 
information sets from 12 to 22 quarters does not improve very much the performance of 
the Sticky Information models such as we consider 12 quarters represent a good 
approximation of the infinite sum in terms of contracts duration. In the overall, the 
introduction of indexation, under mixed SI models, does not by itself add more 
persistence in the two specifications and basically, the choice of the price structure seems 
to be much more important. 
 
5.2.  Model Comparison Based on Posterior Distribution  
Tables A1 to A7 of Appendix-A,* present information about the posterior 
distributions of the two pricing schemes, under different assumptions. In the standard 
case (without indexation), while most of estimated parameters are quite similar, the 
estimated degree of wage indexation is significantly high in the Sticky Information model 
under Calvo wage contracts (0.76) and low in the Calvo model (0.21). 
In the same way, the variance of wage markup is 0.40 in SI model vs 0.19 in Calvo 
model. We can also note an important difference across the pricing regarding the 
persistence degree of the preference shock and its variance (respectively in Calvo and SI : 
2.54 vs 1.95 and 5.30 vs 9.34). 
As a result, the Sticky information assumption has different implications for some 
key parameters including the ones in the policy instrument. The degree of inertia is 
slightly smaller in that this model as opposed to the Calvo specification. This shows that 
model parameters are highly sensitive to both specifications; therefore, it is difficult to 
conclude the degree of robustness of each model specification. As both models can 
produce an important degree of persistence such as the choice of Sticky Price against 
Sticky Information is not sufficient to determine dynamics properties of two key 
variables inflation and output. 
 
5.3.  Model Comparison Based on Impulse Responses 
Figures B1 to B8 of Appendix-B compare the models’ estimated impulse responses 
of main variables after one percent increase in key structural shocks, showing the 90 
percent posterior bands and the median of the posterior densities. Figures B1 show the 
responses after a productivity shock. Across both Calvo models, the propagation of the 
shock is consistent, though in the hybrid version, the inflation displays a ‘hump-shaped’ 
curvature after the few initial impact. As opposed to the SI model, the Calvo models can 
 
*For detail results of this Appendix (Tables A1 to A7) please contact the authors via email: rdrissi@esg.fr 
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bring down the policy instrument slightly longer below its steady state in the short run. In 
the overall, the short run responses are much stronger under the Sticky information pricing 
due to its volatile short run dynamics for the nominal variables. Indeed, after an initial 
boost, the variables more quickly come back towards the long-run values. 
Regarding the responses of output and inflation to a Monetary Policy shock 
(Figure B2), both specifications lead to a hump-shaped response of inflation (except for 
the pure FL Calvo model). First of all, the standard Calvo model exposes an immediate 
response of inflation. Mankiw and Reis (2002) criticise in the fixed prices models, the 
absence of delay in the inflation reaction. While it seems to be only a feature related to 
the fixed prices forward looking models, the hybrid Calvo reproduce a reaction of 
inflation less delayed than the response of the Sticky Information model. Moreover, this 
last specification respect the condition of a more delayed response of inflation than 
Output while in the Calvo models the response of inflation is faster. Indeed, the peak 
slightly occurs before the one of Output. 
Besides, in the Smets andWouters (2003) model under Calvo contracts, the price 
markup shock is dominant in the inflation driving. In the Sticky Information models, such 
shocks lead to responses less persistent into the main selected variables, returning more 
quickly to their Steady State than in the Calvo models (Figures B3 and B4). Paustian and 
Pytlarczik (2006) show the estimation of a Calvo model without markup shock induces a 
marginal likelihood lower and advance one explanation for the poor fit could be the 
inability of Sticky Information models to match the volatility of inflation as well as the 
persistence of inflation and real wages. Indeed, such non structural shocks play an 
important role in the inflation persistence, in particular for the model comparison. 
 
5.4.  Welfare Comparison Based on Optimal Monetary Policy 
In this section, the Ramsey allocation is computed by solving the first order 
approximation of the equilibrium conditions. Figures B1 and B2 refer to the responses of 
aggregates after an efficient supply shock. Concerning the productivity shock, the Ramsey 
allocation generates a stronger and faster response of real variables and real wage in the 
Calvo Model but weaker and slower in the SI model. The associated interest rate path is 
much more accommodative in the short term but reverts very quickly to its initial level. 
In the overall, for both models, over longer horizons, the response of real variables 
becomes significantly closer in both monetary regimes. Regarding the labour supply 
shock, in the Calvo model, the hump-shaped downward under the Ramsey policy 
stimulated output, consumption and investment and leaves quasi-unchanged inflation and 
real wages. Under Sticky Information pricing, the effect is weaker and the hump-shaped 
stimulates all the aggregates. By contrast, the estimated rule is not supportive enough to 
prevent a decrease in real wage and inflation, above all in the SI model where the interest 
rate is close to the steady state value. 
Turning now to efficient demand shocks, the increase in consumption after a 
preference shock, is more limited under the Ramsey policy than the alternative rule, and 
the contraction in investment is stronger. In the Calvo model, the output decreases in 
short term under the Ramsey allocation while inflation and real wage are almost fully 
stabilised while in the SI model, the output is stabilised and the real wage decreases in 
short term. Under estimated rule, such a shock is expansionary on output and upward 
pressures emerge on real wages and inflation. 
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For the others demand shocks, the differences noted above are less pronounced. 
The responses of output, consumption, investment and real wages to an investment shock 
or a government spending shock are relatively similar under Ramsey policy and he 
estimated rule, even if the inflation response is much more muted in the Ramsey 
allocation (see Figures B4 and B5 in Appendix). 
Figures B6 to B8 refer to inefficient shocks. The transmission of price markup 
shocks to the economy is not strongly different under both monetary regimes which 
suggest a similar inflation/output tradeoff for this type of shock. However, in the case of 
wage markup and external finance premium shocks, the Ramsey policy is much more 
restrictive. It delivers lower real variables and more stable inflation. In the overall, 
compared with the estimated Taylor rule, the Ramsey policy accommodates more 
strongly the efficient supply shocks, leans more against efficient demand shocks. In 
addition, the optimal policy is much more responsive to labour market shocks than the 
estimated rule which incorporates only goods market variables such as inflation and 
output. 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
This paper considers a closed economy version of DSGE model with various 
nominal frictions vis-à-vis monetary-cum-fiscal blocks to seek the basic query that how 
monetary policy impacts while in the presence of nominal frictions, like price stickiness, 
staggered wages, etc. Using Bayesian Simulation techniques, we estimate the model for 
the closed economy. Our simulation results show that despite the apparent similarities 
these frictions, their responses to shocks and fit to data are quite different and there is no 
agreement on their relative performance. Both these hypotheses can produce an important 
degree of persistence such as the choice of Sticky Price against Sticky Information is not 
sufficient to determine dynamics properties of two key variables inflation and output. 
Hence, as a result, monetary authorities cannot afford to rely on a single reference model 
which contains few nominal frictions of the economy but need to model a large number 
of alternative ways available when they take their decision of optimal monetary policy. 
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Appendices 
APPENDIX B 
MODEL IMPULSE RESPONSES 
Fig. B1. Dynamic Responses to a Productivity Shock 
 
 
 
Fig. B2. Dynamic Responses to a Labour Shock
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Fig. B3. Dynamic Responses to a Preference Shock 
 
 
Fig. B4. Dynamic Responses to a Price Markup Shock 
 
 
Fig. B5. Dynamic Responses to a Wage Markup Shock 
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Fig. B6. Dynamic Responses to an External Finance Premium Shock 
 
 
Fig. B7. Dynamic Responses to an Investment Shock 
 
 
 
Fig. B8. Dynamic Responses to a Government Spending Shock 
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